

S-2450 & 2450-A
Effects of the Intensified Air War
Against North Vietnam

No Date Map of North Vietnam showing bombing targets (I think)

No Date Blind Memo re Effects of the Intensified Air War Against
 North Vietnam (1st and 2nd draft)

29 Aug 67 Helms to the President memo re Effects of the Intensified
 Air War Against North Vietnam

30 Aug 67 Helms to Rostow informal note re additional info
 requested on above subject

Attachment: Helms to The President memo, dated
 30 Aug 67, re Effects of the Intensified
 Air War Against North Vietnam (state-
 ments on the manpower problem in NVN;
 essential military traffic in NVN)

Mr. Walt W. Rostow

This is the additional paper you requested last evening.

Since it was your initiative, I leave entirely to you whether or not you pass this on to the President.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms

Attachment

30 August 1967

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DDI

(Attachment: Let to the President, Subject: Effects of the Intensified Air War Against North Vietnam.

Executive Registry

67-4136/1

30 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

**SUBJECT : Effects of the Intensified Air
War Against North Vietnam**

The Manpower Problem in North Vietnam

1. The overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that North Vietnamese manpower resources are almost certainly more than adequate to support the war effort at present levels for an extended period and probably are adequate to support an expanded effort. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

We feel these data and analyses give us a reasonably clear picture of the general manpower situation.

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2. Although conflicting reports make it impossible to determine the precise terms for conscription, we believe that the present draft age is 17-35. We have a few reports that 16 year olds have been drafted. We regard these occurrences as atypical and probably reflective of local recruitment problems, or uneven and arbitrary application of draft regulations, rather than national conscription policies. The lowering of the draft age would be an extreme measure which we estimate Hanoi would not adopt until it had exhausted the several other options available for fuller mobilization of its manpower resources.

Essential Military Traffic in North Vietnam

3. We define essential military traffic as the movement of material and equipment necessary for the defense of North Vietnam and the logistic support of its military establishment in both North and South Vietnam. We include in this traffic the supplies and equipment needed to maintain the

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logistical pipelines, and the supply requirements (excluding food) of the Communist forces in South Vietnam.

4. In terms of military imports from abroad, this traffic amounts currently to 550 tons a day. Most of this is consumed within North Vietnam. Only slightly over 10 percent of this amount--60 tons a day-- is moved out of North Vietnam to maintain its logistic pipelines and to support the Communist forces in South Vietnam. The movement of this traffic requires the use of less than 5 percent of the capacity available for moving imports into North Vietnam and well below 10 percent of the capacity of the infiltration routes through Laos.

5. The bombings have greatly complicated the movement of military traffic to the South and raised the internal requirements for war materiel. Imports of antiaircraft ammunition during 1966, for example, were double the volume imported during 1965, and will be even greater in 1967.

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6. The air interdiction program has had little impact, however, on the actual volume of military supplies being delivered to South Vietnam. It would, moreover, not be a restraining factor in determining the amounts of troops or supplies North Vietnam might wish to move south in the future. Assuming that North Vietnam must maintain infiltration at its current rates in order to replace losses, we estimate that it would not be able to put more than an additional 70,000 troops in South Vietnam without sacrificing minimum home defense requirements. This force increase would raise daily external logistic requirements in South Vietnam by only 10 tons a day, assuming the greater part of their food continues to come from Cambodia. Thus, the flow of military traffic would still remain below any capacity levels to which air attack could reasonably be expected to reduce the infiltration routes.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

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ync 31- 8 31 VN .P/ /s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH

30 August 1967

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29 AUG 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President**SUBJECT : Effects of the Intensified Air War Against North Vietnam****SUMMARY**

The intensified air war against North Vietnam has shown increased effectiveness in several ways: (1) the cost of bomb damage in the past four months almost equals the total damage inflicted in 1966; (2) most of modern industry is now at a standstill, thus neutralizing a decade of economic growth; (3) the rail transport system is now coping with its most serious disruption to date; (4) the port of Haiphong is confronted with a growing resupply burden; and (5) the regime has been forced to adopt a more rigid evacuation program, now involving essential as well as non-essential activities and personnel. At the same time, however, Hanoi continues to meet the needs of the Communists in South Vietnam and essential military and economic traffic continues to move.

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but on CIA letterhead

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1. Since March 1967 over 10,000 attack sorties per month have been flown against targets in North Vietnam, compared to 6,500 per month during the same period in 1966. An increased hammering is being given to the more lucrative targets in the north. During January-March 1967, less than 10 percent of all attack sorties were flown in Route Package VI; in July the share had increased to 33 percent. Since March, 78 important targets have been struck for the first time, including 25 SAM sites and 29 targets within 10-mile radii of Hanoi and Haiphong.

2. The intensified air war has increased North Vietnam's economic losses and compounded management and logistical problems. The direct cost of damage to economic and military targets during March-July 1967--about \$110 million--was almost equal to the total damage inflicted in 1966.

3. Damage to electric power generating facilities has been particularly severe and brought much of the country's modern industry to a standstill. All of the central generating plants in the main Hanoi-Haiphong

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network, with the exception of the Hanoi plant itself, have been out of service since early June.

4. The country's only cement plant and its only metallurgical plant have ceased production because of bomb damage and the loss of electric power supply. One of the two major textile plants has been heavily damaged; production in the small fertilizer and chemical industry has been curtailed and paper production has been reduced by 80 percent. Thus, many achievements of a decade of industrial growth have been neutralized and, in some cases, lost.

5. During recent weeks the main thrust of the air attack has been against key bridges and LOC's in the Hanoi area. The vital rail lines to China and Haiphong were particularly hard hit. Attacks on the Doumer Bridge and the rail bypass over the Canal des Rapides have effectively limited through rail traffic from China to a rail ferry bypass around the Doumer Bridge. This bypass has been seeded with magnetic influence bombs. The combination of these measures has resulted in the most serious disruption

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to the rail system since the start of the bombing. Although essential military and economic traffic continues to move, this effort is taxing the system heavily and is done with far more difficulty and cost than previously.

6. Much of the resupply burden is being handled at the port of Haiphong where port congestion has increased significantly. The time required to unload ships has doubled in the past few months. These delays result from the sharp increase in imports since March, reflecting in large part the material requirements imposed by the air attack and the use of the Haiphong sanctuary area for mass storage of supplies.

7. Reports from Hanoi indicate that the evacuation program is now being enforced more rigidly. A recent order reportedly now in effect repeats earlier directives calling for the removal of children and non-essential personnel as well as the personnel of all small industries and handicraft cooperatives, merchants, and their families. More significantly, the new order also calls for some large state

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enterprises and ministries to begin evacuation. Thus, there is now a much greater emphasis on evacuation of essential as well as non-essential activities from the Hanoi area, with all its attendant negative effects on productivity and public morale.

8. Despite the increasing hardships, economic losses and mounting problems in management and logistics caused by the air war, Hanoi continues to meet its own needs and to support its aggression in South Vietnam. Essential military and economic traffic continues to move.

Richard Helms
Director

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/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH**Deputy Director for Intelligence**

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29 Aug 67**Date****SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

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